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Abstract
Hallmark sporting events have evolved from a competitive opportunity of showing national pride
to commercially driven entertainment entities which seem to prosper from the economic stimulation of the
event. Due to the growing popularity of these mega-sport events, cities and countries around the world are
continually evaluating the potential of using these events to draw attention to the host. This thesis seeks to
contribute to the controversial discussion of whether or not to invest in hosting a mega-sport event. Every
stage of sporting events can reveal positive or negative influences, starting from a competitive bidding
process, to the construction of infrastructure, and to the post-event effects. This thesis will focus on three
aspects: (i) the anticipated impact of hosting a mega sport event in the short run versus long run by analyzing
notable macroeconomic variables: expenditure, investment, and government spending; (ii) econometric
analysis of long run panel data of gross domestic product per capita growth; and (iii) will also attempt to
answer the question of why hosting a mega sport event did or did not work via. Applying basic
macroeconomic principles, the original hypothesis suggested that the impact of hosting a mega-sport event
would result in an expected short-run burst domestic product per capita (GDPPC) followed by a slight
leveling off of the GDPPC in the medium and long term. Applying linear regressions over a twenty-year
period, it is possible to evaluate the impact of hosting an event. Such analysis of the data indicated that it
may be worthwhile for a country to host the World Cup but hosting either of the Olympic Games would
likely be a costly endeavor.
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Overview/Intro
High-profile sporting events have increasingly been advocated by governments and marketing
and decision-making strategists as high impact catalysts for economic development in cities and nations.
In particular, the events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games draw significant numbers
of domestic and international tourists, attract television and corporate sponsorship (Lee, C; 2009).1 Since
1984, the competition to host the Olympic Games has grown immensely. Economists repeatedly refer to
key goals/outcomes behind why cities are so keen to host such an event. These factors that are often
though tot motivate corporate involvement and public support include: the opportunity to advertise
products to a global audience (raising a host country’s or city’s corporate investment value), leverage
business opportunities in export and new investment, enhance the tourist industry of the host country, and
boost citizen pride (Barney, 2002).2 In reality, the Games begin when cities and nations first devote
enormous amounts of organizational time and money with somewhat outlandish expectations of
benefiting both empirically and implicitly. Hosting major sporting events is associated with the belief that
the ‘buzz’ will draw sizeable crowds and tourists who will spend money in the city/nation. Further,
another perceived economic benefit is than an event is a powerful stimulus due to multiplier effects,
employment bonuses, and the overall economic stimulus supplement that a major sporting event naturally
offers. On the other hand, organizers often overlook or discount the operational, implicit, and opportunity
costs that are associated with this type of event and assume unreasonable expectations. Despite the natural
overhyped characteristic linked with mega-sport events, the initial default policy/economic policy
expectation is that of a city/nation can afford to host a mega event, the benefits that a nation implicitly
acquires, in addition to its tangible benefits (money, revenue), outweigh these inherent up-front incurred
costs.

1
Lee, C., Taylor, T.; University of Technology (Sydney); Journal of Macroeconomics; Critical Reflections on the Economic Impact Assessment
of a Mega-Event: The Case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup; https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0261517704000640/1-s2.0-S0261517704000640main.pdf?_tid=933e6f76-8351-4eed-bc55-020b2952ac15&acdnat=1537848847_0c6d34aa900e40113854713150398b22

2

R. Barney, S. Wenn, S. Martyn; Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism, The
University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City (2002)
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The merit of hosting a sporting event is much more than the event itself where sporting events, such as the
World Cup and Summer/Winter Olympic Games, are viewed as valuable opportunities for the host
nations and urban economies to stimulate economic growth, urban renewal, employment and improve
nation stature. There are also intangible benefits (legacy benefits) (Preuss, 2011) of hosting such as: (i)
media presence which can lead to long-term increase in tourism and be an attraction of new foreign
investment; (ii) long-lasting infrastructure with a potential for a variety of uses; (iii) and a signal of trade
liberalization that promotes greater trade activity in the long term. If such results were consistently true,
however, then every city, state and nation-governing body would apply to host this world invitational
event. Hosting mega-events requires significant investments. Zimbalist (2015) notes emerging economies
like China, Brazil, and South Africa have increasingly perceived “mega-events as a sort of coming-out
party signaling that [they are] now a modernized economy, ready to make [their] presence felt in world
trade and politics.”3 Their intentions may be noble, but the intention of using mega-events as a “comingout party” means developing countries hoping to host them need to make massive investments. Notably,
the 2004 Sumer Olympic Games in Greece cost roughly $16 billion, 2014 World Cup cost Brazil $20
billion, and the 2008 Olympics cost Beijing roughly $40 billion. Prior to the bidding process, should
overestimate the total incurred costs and underestimate the total produced benefits.

3

Zimbalist 2015; Is It Worth It?; Finance and Development; Vol. 47 p. 8-11
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Literature Review
In recent decades, major sporting events have been recognized as an opportunity to stimulate
economic growth through government expenditure, foreign investment, new money consumption and the
introduction of future trade possibilities. Substantiated author and grad student publications have
illuminated analysis and measurements of the economic impacts of these major sporting events. Their
research has evaluated whether or not mega-events lead to access to previously inaccessible funds and
increased investments. These investments would theoretically come from supranational organizations,
private stakeholders, public stakeholders, or tourists (Barrios). We also consider whether or not these new
expenditures and investments have the direct, indirect, multiplicative, or induced effects (Kasimati). In
this field, Kasimati (date), and Lee (date) recognize the different economic approaches that have been
considered when trying to measure the impact that hosting mega sporting events incur. On the other hand,
Brunet, Overmyer and Plenderleith illustrate strict cost-benefit analysis to indicate the direct impact on
the hosts of the major sporting events. Furthermore, studies conducted from Preuss (date) and Collett of
Colorado College (date) justify the substantial economic burden incurred for the organization of the
mega-event in the face of the consequent increase in consumption spending, foreign investment, and
employment. In this line of research are inserted contributions from: (i) Kasimati (date) and Lee (date)
that demonstrate the importance of incorporating multipliers into the calculations of macroeconomic
impact; (ii) Meurer (date), ERNST & Young Terco (2015) and Collett (date) indicate how the
introduction of new money directly and indirectly connected to a mega event, specifically the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympics, the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics, 2002 FIFA World Cup in South Korea/Japan,
and the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil; (iii) and Gong (2008) that theorizes the fragility of the mega
investment profile, indicating that a mega-sporting event is a double-edged sword. If it could be used in
the right way, it would bring magnificent benefits; otherwise the hosting opportunity of a mega-sporting
event would be costly.
Conversely, there are some authors that tend to analyze the adverse effects and consequences that
negatively impact economies the of the host country. Barrios and Russel of Harvard Kennedy School
(2011) as well as Plenderleith (2012) argue that the vast majority of literature fails to substantiate a
relationship between mega-events and the increased economic activity. Overall, the expected economic
benefits of hosting an event are vastly overstated and the real benefits are outweighed by the costs
associated with event preparation and execution. The only case where the argument of failed
substantiation could be justified was made by Kim (2008) and (Lee, 2002) who theorized that in the long
term, the Games and world mega events significantly contribute in economic reputation and stature.
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The first part of this paper will use macroeconomic theory and analysis to create a generalized
hypothesis as to what should happen if a city or country decides to take on the responsibility of hosting
such an event. Several authors have ventured into the idea of analyzing the theoretical short term and long
term benefits and costs of hosting mega events. One of the most significant of which is Professor Victor
Matheson (2006) of Holy Cross, who measured the impact of such events through data and logic and
concluded that hosting these events are seemingly high costs and low reward. The early spending may
spur quick economic activity, but the tangible benefits in the end are outweighed by the initial costs. He
also noted economic variations in hosting economies. The data gathered for the econometric side of this
thesis has a wide variance in term of economic differences (developed versus developing) from the World
Cup to the Olympics. Essentially, the World Cup hosts are more varied in terms of economic variation
where developing countries in South America are just as probable to host the World Cup as developed
European or North American countries. The Summer Olympic Games are a little less varied but we see
smallest variation in hosting nations of the Winter Olympic Games. The Winter Olympic Games are
mainly hosted by Nordic, prosperous European, or North American countries, most of which are
characterized with a substantially higher gross domestic product per capita. Matheson stresses that if
developing countries want to experience more economy growth, they stay away from hosting the games
where the initial costs are too great to overcome.
Events end up not being profitable for primarily one of two reasons: early overestimation of
profits or underestimation of costs. While this may be the ‘classic’ investment theory, this just happens to
be on a billion-dollar scale. Per the overestimation of revenue streams, both Matheson and Késenne
(2005) demonstrate that although mega sport events can generate adequate revenue for a cost-benefit
spreadsheet, the distribution of the money does not automatically favor the host city where a substantial
portion often falls on the international investors, non-local hospitality and service suppliers, and
international sporting government bodies.4 A possible positive effect was noted by Qi Gong (2012), from
the University of Nevada, that building stadiums for the hosting of the Games often create spill-over
effects. Infrastructure is often built where the land is cheap and impoverished, any presence of money in
those areas due to the mega sport event would be considered a benefit regardless of how much.5 A
possible negative is the aforementioned where the local economy often sees less revenue than originally
estimated from the hosted event and thus the overestimation hurts in budgeting for the future, ultimately
landing the host in debt. Despite a multitude of documented research that suggests the complexity and

4

Késeenne, S.; European Sports Management Quarterly, 5, 133-142 (2005); Do we need an economic impact study or a cost-benefit analysis of a
sports event?
5
Gong, Qi.; University of Nevada; The Positive and Negative Economic Contributions of Mega-Sporting Events to Local Communities;
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=thesesdissertations
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profitability, applicant cities often take for granted the disparity in the generated revenues in the short-run
versus the anticipated long-run revenues generated from trade, upgrading their infrastructure, and
attracting future corporate investment (local and foreign) into their local economy.
The second reason why countries become unsuccessful hosts is due to their underestimation of
investment costs. A majority of these costs are found in the investment in infrastructure in preparation for
the event: stadiums, media villages, and structures to host the influx of millions of people. Harry Arne
Solberg and Holger Preuss (2007) analyze the reasoning behind that and conclude that cities spend
substantial amounts of money rebuilding versus upgrading infrastructure. While this can create welfareeconomic gains (long term implicit benefits), this does not assure that the tangible benefits will exceed the
costs. With many of these host cities placing a significant part of their revenue on inbound tourism, this
also creates such a high risk gamble on people. When circumstances allow, events can stimulate tourism
but this visitor influx is not indicative of a long-term demand curve (of a normal supply demand market)
outward shift, but rather a short term burst. If producers behave rationally, they will supply the market
with more goods and the supply curve would shift outward as well to regulate the equilibrium price.
Indirectly, tourism can improve the host’s ability to capitalize on economies of scale but local residents
would obtain non-local goods and services, which would disappear over time.
The largest component of hosting is the short term investment and long term impact in
infrastructure. A number of factors can inhibit long-term tourism demand but the event’s promotion will
not consistently be able to draw in the same amount of tourists post-event as during the event. One of the
few analysis using (publicly available) data sets was created by Anita Mehrotra (2011).The thesis was a
comparative study on the long run impacts specific to the Olympic Games. The study took into account
the massive pre-event expenditure on infrastructure and tourism expenditure during the event and
compared it to the lack-there-of in a non-host city over a twenty-year period. The study ultimately found
that after the initial spurt in economic activity around the event (at time = 0), the economic progress, in
terms of gross domestic product (GDP), significantly slowed. In some comparative cases, the GDP
growth slowed so much that the control country (non-host) ended up surpassing the host country within
ten years after the event.6 This ultimately led her to conclude that the initial ‘sugar rush’ of hosting a
mega sport event was not worth it in the end on average. The figure below illustrates the long-term
comparative study:7

6

Mehrotra, A., Saez, E.; UC Berkeley; To Host or Not to Host? A comparison Study of the Long-Run Impacts of the Olympic Games
https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/mehrotra_anita.pdf
7
Mehrotra, A., Saez, E.; UC Berkeley; To Host or Not to Host? A comparison Study of the Long-Run Impacts of the Olympic Games
https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/mehrotra_anita.pdf
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Figure 1

There are many theories that can explain why this conclusion may occur: variances in countries
chosen, elimination of positive outliers (Barcelona, Spain), Dutch disease (a net negative impact on an
economy that originated from a sharp inflow of foreign currency), or poor allocation of resources. For the
most part, research would suggest that it is not worth it to host such an event where the intangible benefits
are nearly impossible to measure and the tangible benefits are surpassed by the cost. Based on the leading
literature, authors (Victor Matheson, Thomas Miceli, Andrew Zimbalist) would generally conclude that it
just purely based on revenue streams, it is possible to generate a profit from a structured event such as the
World Cup due to the sheer size, but highly unlikely to yield a profit from an event such as the Olympic
Games. Upon attending an economist panel concerning this topic, Victor Matheson and Andrew
Zimbalist clarified that it is possible for outliers to occur such as Los Angeles ’84 or Barcelona ’92. Mr.
Matheson dubbed this as the ‘hidden gem theory’ where the city must be characterized with the right
potential in resources to have a long-term positive effect. When Salt Lake City hosted the Winter
Olympic Games (’02), their revenue change over the past fifteen years compared to Denver ski slopes
have increased significantly. In this sense, a city’s potential relies on its ability to change for its future
economy and its location. For example, Salt Lake City was a growing and well-known ski destination. Its
hosting of the Games only required the park to invest in park improvements for the future (that would
have been made anyway) and further boosted its already recognized name. In the case of Atlanta,
however, it is not an internationally recognized city. Hosting the Olympics would certainly help in the
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short term, but the city location and culture is constantly second-rate to Nashville and people naturally
regress back to the larger well-known cities. If people ask where someone wants to go on vacation, they
would likely say Salt Lake City for a ski vacation or Los Angeles in the winter. This is where the
retention of natural tourism differs between cities already developed or considered to be a ‘hidden gem’
and cities that are not prime for a breakout on the world stage.8
The general consensus explains that through econometrics, it nearly impossible to yield positive
statistically significant results when analyzing data surrounding the Olympics. According to Mr.
Zimbalist, “hosting the event creates the same short-run economic boost equivalent to borrowing a billion
dollars and using it to build a hole in the city center.” There would be a billion dollars in short term
spending, but the city and country would be a billion dollars more in debt than before and have no way to
turn that into a profit. Hosting a mega-sport event comes down to the incurred costs, as mentioned before.
At the panel, Mr. Zimbalist stated that the cost-overruns are almost the sole reason why hosting fails. If a
politician wants to get elected or focus on bring in the Olympics or World Cup, he or she will absolutely
understate the costs to gain public support. At a minimum, the bidding cost for the World Cup or
Olympics costs anywhere from $60-$100 million. There are four categories of spending: (i) operations
budget, which is the cost of operating the event; (ii) permanent sports venues, which include the Olympic
village, (iii) infrastructure, which will be stressed later; (iv) and security. The aggregate of such categories
varies between $14.8-$23.1 billion. In conclusion, the investment in these games would spur billions of
dollars in economic activity, but would not be sustained and would eventually hurt the economy.
Econometric analysis illustrates this relationship of an unsustainable expenditure pattern where a shortterm economic boost is completely undermined by the long-term downfall, per the Olympic Games. This
is why it is nearly impossible to yield statistically positive results when examining the impact of the
Games.

8

Victor Matheson, Andrew Zimbalist, Thomas Miceli; “Olympics Lecture” (University of Connecticut Law, April 12th, 2019.)
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The differentiation between the Games and the World Cup was examined by Dr. Miceli. He explained
that due to the spread out nature, size, and duration of the World Cup, the revenue streams will be
astronomically larger. This is in part why the World Cup hosts experience just made the games longer and
larger to create more revenue. Another reason that World Cup host experience marginally more success is
due to the destinations chosen: all places with soccer (fútbol) leagues. This makes the infrastructure costs
significantly less. Due to the spread out nature of the event, the costs are spread out among different cities
(sometimes other nations) and the profits created catalyze economic activity in all of the different places
where the competitions are held; unlike the centralized pattern of the Olympics. Theoretically, it is more
probable that hosting the World Cup would produce more positive outcomes than hosting either of the
Olympic Games.
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Theoretical Model
The literature review suggests there is no general consensus as to whether or not hosting a mega-sport
event helps or hinders economic growth. One theory supported by several macroeconomists suggests that
hosting a mega-sport event increases international awareness and thus results in a positive, short-lived,
economic effect on the output. Conversely, a numerous amount of existing literature indicates the
opposite: that hosting such an event causes a negative short-term impact on the growth of the economy.
Short-Term Economic Impact:
We will briefly touch on the subject of legacies and implicit benefits/costs to address possible
reasoning as to why host countries and cities primarily desire to host the event and yet some are unable to
consistently replicate these results. A legacy is an externality (external phenomenon) that arises in the
wake of the event which attempts to capture people’s behavior. Some of the positive legacies include:
urban revival, improved public welfare, reduced unemployment, host city marketing, projection of
cultural values, and economic signaling that the host is ready to engage in business with the rest of the
world (if not already). On the other hand, negative legacies include: traffic produced from incoming
visitors, production of real estate bubble due to raised prices, employment is only temporary, and further
socioeconomic hierarchical differentiation. Unfortunately, further research would suggest that there is no
accurate way to accurately measure the impact of the implicit benefits or costs. Two different methods
have been used in attempt to capture the gravity of the implicit benefits: top down approach and the
bottom up approach. The top down approach is very controversial where one author stated that “In theory
one only needs to compare the economic variables of a city/region, which staged the event with the same
variables of the city/region not staging the event” (Hanusch, 1992).9 This model was found to be
oversimplified as it assumed many variables were equal between the control and treatment group. The
bottom up approach attempted to measure the value of the values by measuring the lasting infrastructure
the investment into the games produced. The approach considered the development of the city between
the control city versus the treatment (host) city. While both approaches were attempted, both were found
to be static and unable to truly capture unforeseen elasticities.

9
Preuss, H.; Johannes Guttenberg-Universitat Mainz, Germany; Lasting Effects of Major Sporting Events;
https://idrottsforum.org/articles/preuss/preuss061213.pdf
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While some theories also address the implicit and intangible benefits (country image leading to
increased tourism) and costs (increase in human traffic and pollution from increased tourism), this section
will primarily focus on the tangible Gross Domestic Product of a country and equation-driven aspects of
theoretical macroeconomics. Normally, an economy is determined by either measuring the gross domestic
product per a given year via the expenditure, income, or value added approach. The theory explained will
use the expenditure approach which suggests GDP is determined by the equation:
Y = C(Y - T) + G + I(r) + NX(r)
Y= Gross Domestic Product
C = aggregate consumption expenditure of country’s goods and services
I = aggregate amount of a country’s investment
G = aggregate of a country’s government expenditure
NX = net result of a country’s exports and imports
This equation identifies the expenditure approach to measuring the output of an economy (GDP)
by accruing the total amount of spending in the economy from consumers, government, investment, and
foreign trades. Consumption (C) is normally the largest GDP component in the economy consisting of
private (household) expenditures. It is a function of how much income people have subtracted by the
amount they owe the government in taxes. Investment (I) includes the purchasing of intermediary goods
that would help create the final goods such as business investment in equipment to produce their final
good that would appear on store shelves. Government (G) spending is measured as the aggregate if all
government purchases of final goods and services. It includes salaries of public servants, purchase of
military weapons, and any foreign expenditure by the government. Next exports (NX) represents the gross
exports subtracting the total imports. GDP captures the amount a country produces including those from
foreign nations’ consumption, thus exports are added. Imported goods are deduced to avoid counting the
foreign supply as domestic.
Nations and cities compete to host international sporting events such as the World Cup and
Summer and Winter Olympic Games even if large investment costs are incurred. When a city decides to
undertake a mega sporting event, they do so with the intention that hosting such an event will provide
many direct financial benefits as well as countless indirect benefits. Since there has been no credible way
of calculating the intangible benefits a country receives due to hosting a mega sport event, this analysis
will focus on the theoretical benefits: taxes, income, unemployment, and small project investment and
how these variables affect the larger economic indicators a country reflects.
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Theoretically, hosting such events as the World Cup would elicit a positive impact on the
economy provided that the incurred costs are not exorbitantly larger. Usually, the main source of revenue
is generated by the influx of tourists. This mass attraction of international tourists should cause an
aggregate increase in the consumption variable (C) in the Keynesian equation. Let us estimate a minimum
of two million people enter the country for the duration of the event and each spend a minimum $100 per
jersey of their favorite player (World Cup). Conservatively, tourists will contribute a positive $200
million in aggregate expenditure (C).
Hosting a mega sport event would also enact a multitude of chain reactions due to an influx of
tourism: (i) decrease in unemployment where there would be more employment opportunities for local
workers; (ii) ultimate increase in government spending; (iii) and in increase in net exports due to preevent spending in infrastructure. With more expenditure occurring in the economy, businesses would
have more resources to pay workers higher wages. This increase in income would allow for either more
expenditure (increase in C), more savings (more bank lending), and a higher tax rate. A higher tax rate
means the government has more money to spend on local projects, such as pre-event investing in
infrastructure. This investment in infrastructure in addition to an increase in aggregate expenditure would
elicit an increase in Gross Domestic Product (Y) and thus an increase in the overall country interest rate.
The figure below illustrates the increase in the interest rate due to an aggregate increase in a country’s
GDP where liquidity demand (L) is a function of Y (GDP).

Figure 2

i’
L’(i,Y)
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As seen in the above figure, an increase in aggregate expenditure elicits an increase in the
liquidity demand and macro interest rate. This results in an increase a decrease in the exchange rate where
domestic currency becomes more affordable and desirable to foreign nations. An increase in the foreign
desire of domestic products indicates a positive sum in net exports. Logically, in influx of tourism should
elicit a positive aggregate impact on the economy.
Commonly found, however, is that there appears to be a negative impact on host countries for
several years after the Olympic Games are held. As pointed out in the most current research on the longrun effects (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002) this negative impact on the host countries may be a result of
the increase in domestic investment and excitement for hosting the Olympics. This, in turn, would lead to
an increase in domestic and international demand for host country's products and would most likely be
seen through the consumption channel of the classic macroeconomic equation for output:
Y = C(Y - T) + G + I(r) + NX(r)
However, this spike in consumption would be relatively short-lived and as public infrastructure
built for the Games remains unused, negative capacity effects could result in a decline in long-run output.
Thus though an increase in government spending is expansionary fiscal policy, the spending on the
Olympic Games may have an even smaller multiplier effect than current research suggests (Ball, 1999).10
This may partially be attributed to the multiplier working the opposite direction: the non-recurring boost
to expenditure results in a longer-run fall in demand as the economy returns to its pre-Olympic
equilibrium income (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002).11 This suggests an explanation for why the impact
is negative for a long period of time after the Games are hosted.
Another explanation for results in contradiction of basic macroeconomic theory would be a loss
of local expenditure. One of the largest positive explanations promoting hosting a mega sport event is due
to the resulting mass of expenditure from tourists and media rights. What is not necessarily considered,
however, is the investment from transnational organizations or international investors. Money originally
invested by I.e. Coca Cola, a global organization, will be paid back by the revenues generated from tourist
expenditures. This money will go to the Coca Cola organization and not necessarily to the local economy.
Per the 2014 Brazil, Coca Cola invested around $7.6 billion; since the organization reported a return
10
11

PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002); Business and Economic Benefits of the Sydney 2000 Olympics: A collation of evidence. Sydney
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002); Business and Economic Benefits of the Sydney 2000 Olympics: A collation of evidence. Sydney
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roughly 5%, therefore an extra $380 million generated revenues would return to the Coca Cola company
and thus out of the local economy.12 The supplementary part of this theory of generated money leaving
the economy can be connected through housing. Mega events are frequently characterized by high
capacity constraints and thus high prices for accommodations and hospitality services. Hotel rooms,
villas, and village lodges can sell as high as three times the normal rate during a globalized event because
many people are initially price inelastic. Out of these inflated prices, the desk clerks, valets, cleaning
staff, and complementary services employees’ wages do not triple. Thus as the tourist industry allows for
a significant returns to capital for these hospitality conglomerates, the majority of these services are based
exterior to the local economy and event expenditure leaks of the host economy.
The Impact of Infrastructure Investment:
The empirical section of this thesis will focus on the empirical consequences for long-term
economic growth with hosting a mega event. As such it is imperative to cover the main reason of how a
host economy fails or prospers: infrastructure. Infrastructure is the largest form of investment (majority of
early spending) and government spending with each government’s highest hope of profit attached with it.
This section will focus on the theoretical direct and implicit effects of infrastructure as a long-term
venture due to its sheer importance. The investment in infrastructure is both the key to the financial
success of hosting a mega-sport event and the bridge between the short run costs (pre event) and the long
term economic progress. The major question is whether or not it is worth it to largely finance a billiondollar project for the hope that it will pay off in a decade’s time. The goal of any business investment is
for it to be financially beneficial to the investor. In economics, the objective is to maximize the total
amount of profit filling the demand for a product. An investment in infrastructure is a little riskier where
the investment guarantees a supply of new infrastructure in hopes that the demand will be met by the
sporting event and in the long term by the normal populace. On this supply side of this equation, a city
(Olympics) or country (World Cup) needs to be prepared to host millions of new tourists as well as
accommodate the countries’ sports teams. Precedent illustrates that all hallmark events go through a long
period of preparation ranging from four to eleven years.

12
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Figure 3

The figure above depicts the timeline necessary for the usual amount of time required to be
prepared for the hosting of the mega sport event.13 Countries and cities often require at least six years to
adequately host the event. On the other hand, some cities have infrastructure that enables them to stage
major events with very little need for investment. Consequently, a significantly lower amount of revenue
generated via ticket sales or media coverage is required; this is where most hosts of mega sport events
have come close or experienced profitable returns in both the short and long run.
Many investors understand that while infrastructure investments typically do not generate
economic benefits for another decade, they can create many positives if done correctly. Advocates of
hosting a mega sporting event claim that stadiums and sports infrastructure can serve as a base element to
promoting local economic development. It is envisioned that the stadiums and new transportation build in
tandem would serve as an integrated component of an (often times) gentrifying and diversifying local
economy. Camp Nou (FC Barcelona Stadium) is an easy representation of advocates’ theory; a stadium
that has hosted many international events and tournaments. The stadium was built in 1957 and rests in an
area known as Les Corts, which fifty years ago was a ghetto. This venture posted the highest revenue in
sports history at $770 million annually and generates a host of spillover effects for the local community as
millions of fans travel internationally, not necessarily just for the international competition, to watch the
event. An improved and almost thriving entertainment district has developed around the stadium with
dozens of eating and drinking establishments within a few blocks. While Camp Nou is an example of a
thriving measurable economic benefits, advocates also argue that in certain cases, hosting a mega event
can create significant intangible benefits (novelty effect) for a country, cultural site restoration, and short
term jobs. Some of these short term, intangible benefits stem from the ‘novelty effect’ where more people
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come to view the iconic site because it is ‘new or substantially rebranded as new.’ For example, a recent
study was performed suggesting that a city or country having a UNESCO site would significantly
improve a city’s annual tourism influx. Per the over-hauling of a once-great or outdated sports
arena, these restoration projects would theoretically draw more tourists in towards the event area, if not
for the event. Another argument is that this investment will create short term jobs until completion, for the
duration of nearly a decade. It would not be a solve to unemployment, but it would certainly decrease the
rate for the next country census and create a better image for the country.
Long-Term Infrastructure Planning:
Long-term infrastructure investment is dependent upon the amount of existing infrastructure and
the amount that needs to be built. The equation below indicates that the amount of literature required to be
built is dependent on the amount of infrastructure a host already possesses. Therefore, if a country already
possesses a majority of the edifices in a quality required to host the event or support the influx of tourists
for the event, then the initial investment will be sizably less than those without.
I (I0, In)
I = I0 + In
This implies that city planners would objectively (mathematically) analyze the cost-benefit of
refurbishing stadiums and other infrastructure versus new construction of the same. However, many city
planners do not take this into account. Research shows that many of the investment costs historically
incurred are attributed to the new construction of stadiums that could have been refurbished or building
structures in city areas that impede the existing flow of architecture of a city (all primary structures).
Figure 2 below illustrates an overview of the structures generally required to host such an event: (i) the
primary structure entails the immediate necessities of the athletes for the performance show, (ii) the
secondary structure entails the often illustrious Olympic or World Cup Village and all tributary structures
that athletes require; (iii) the tertiary structure provides for the influx of tourism for the event and
hopefully in the long term.14
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Figure 4

The primary structure of the event-specific construction is for facilities intended for the use by
athletes. This includes the stadiums, required arenas, (indoor and outdoor) and Olympic swimming pools.
Additional to the stage elements, athletic leisure is also built: locker rooms and spas are considered to be
an integral a part of these athletic-specific resorts. The successful host cities tend to transform these
facilities into full time resorts or men’s fitness clubs. This section of infrastructure is the most impactful
in terms of potential costs or benefits. It is necessary for cities to correctly design, integrate and convert
these up-front investments into their respective cities’ long-term economic plans. Research illustrates that
this investment is a ‘double-edged sword’ and could be worth the risk: difficult to execute, expensive, and
necessary for the event; but if performed correctly, this investment could yield positive long-term
benefits.
The secondary structure invested in for a mega event is the development of housing: villages for
athletes, officials, and media representatives. A benefit of this is the resulting gentrification of that part of
the city, which is often a distinct contrast with the previous economic and lifestyle character of the
neighborhood. Barcelona, Spain was completely transformed into a tourist city with its creation of a
beach and its restructuring of the transportation system to fit the new ‘destination city’ style. Other
examples include Seoul and Atlanta for their prosperous hosting of their Summer Olympic Games. In
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addition, the sport parks often created around the city as professional training facilities are typically
converted in the future to recreational fields or resorts. All of these types of investments anchor future
ways for a city to generate long term money from its initial investment into the mega sport event.
The tertiary structure covers all supplementary elements to stage the events: classified herein as
destination city tourism structures. This includes hospitality investments in the form of hotels, new public
transportation from the airport or train station, and restaurants/bars/clubs that promote lively nightlife. To
create destination city structure, further labor is required, which will temporarily allow for the creation of
more jobs. Not every host city invests in a tertiary/destination city structure; yet, most cities have yielded
a long term benefit in their local economies. Theoretically correlated, the tertiary structure, if built
correctly, becomes the building base for rebranding and anchoring the new destination city the mega sport
event. The immediate peak demand (tourism, attendance, media attention, etc.) that accompanies such
events exceeds the capacity in almost every host city (Essex & Chalkley, 1999),15 and as such it is
imperative that every host city is ready to take in the demand of new tourists or they will lose probably
revenue.
When playing the long game, politicians must consider and account for the current infrastructure
the city possesses. A city should consider three areas of its development plan when organizing a major
event: (i) the city development that is necessary irrespective of the sport event, (ii) the infrastructure
required for the sport event that is planned anyway for the general development of the city, and (iii) the
infrastructure that is needed for the event that is not yet included in the city’s long-term plan.16 There is a
possibility that this third aspect can be so expensive, if In = 0, further development of the rest (planned
development that is not related to the event) slows down. One must take into consideration whether eventspecific development exceeds the long-term demand from locals and visitors. A city of 150,000 residents,
for example, does not need a stadium with capacity for 80,000 spectators. It may not be able to host as
many international tourists at a specific venue but in the long run, there may not be as many empty seats
from unsold tickets; thus the initial cost would be minimized. Cities that regard major sport events as
instruments to improve their attractiveness as tourist destinations should consider all three areas of their
city-development plans before bidding for or creating events. This normally would entail taking structural
inventory and then determining the future direction of the city or country: if the host should change
economic strategies as Barcelona did (towards Tourism), use this event as an excuse to build more
sporting stadiums for their host teams as Brazil did, or if the host will simply use it as an excuse to branch
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their country/city image to the world. Most successful case occur when cities use mega-events and their
investments as a catalyst for a full-scale change; whereas countries that justify hosting the event and its
costs solely to leverage or alter the host image with means to attract ‘other people’s money’ and not help
the city build new infrastructure in anticipation of creating a new destination city, have failed to achieve
the sough after, long-term sustained economic benefits.
An alternative argument that has been recurrently made is that infrastructure not only entails
stadiums, but also freeways and train systems. This is considered a large scale hard-infrastructure change
where the whole city landscape can be adapted to the its future. While most cities seem to falter in this
area, an example of profit comes from Barcelona’s hosting of the 1992 Summer Olympics. The regional
commissioner of Catalunya decided to completely redo Barcelona’s train system, city layout, and beach
sites in effort to brand Barcelona as a tourist city. This is one of the few examples in history of long term
economic prosperity from a massive change to infrastructure, but it shows that hosting a mega event
allows for a large scale investment or reinvention of a city in effort for its betterment. Another instance
exemplifies Japan and its use of their upcoming bid for the 2002 FIFA World Cup as an opportunity to
expand upon their initial investment in a technologically advanced subway system. Many people express
their train system today is still one of the best innovations and train systems the world has to offer. While
Japan’s economy and demographics struggles in many other ways, technological advancement and
implementation into their city foundations is not one of those.
Long-term investment structure is one of the large make-or-break points when preparing to host a
mega sport event. Conventional economic theory suggests that the increase in spending via the
government, consumers, and private investment would increase short run gross domestic products. In fact,
many large sporting events do often generate revenues that cover the operational costs of the event, but
not the full investment costs. Despite a large spurt of spending, what the expenditure approach does not
indicate, is the big crater of debt this mass-spending creates (per the investment in infrastructure). This
can create negative long run effects by reducing other activities that require tax funding. The 2002 Athens
Summer Olympics, which left the city with enormous financial debt, is a well-known example of this
phenomenon. In general, public and private investment often share the burden of financing the
investments but with hefty interest percentage (cost of debt) placed on the returns. Government revenue
needed to pay these interest rates and re-pay principal amounts depends on government returns from the
initial investment into hosting the event and a higher collection of taxes generated, ironically, by the
expected growth in the local economy generated by the event. It is a higher interdependent circle where if
the investment is not mapped and carried out correctly, a billion-dollar investment goes to waste (does not
generate any return that would go back into the positive-feedback-looped economy). Taxes can also be an
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independent variable. Whether or not the additional revenue generated by the event or the creation of new
jobs makes its way to citizens’ pockets (because of their new wages can be taxed) is not necessarily felt
by the local individual or health of the city.
Long-Term Theoretical Economic Impact:
The long run goal of hosting a mega-sport event will be to sustain the theoretical economic
benefit (from spending in the short run) and capitalizing on the investments made on infrastructure and
transportation. The previous few pages have covered the importance of infrastructure investment in the
short and long run. This subsequent section will focus on economic theories that relate to the empirical
conclusions of this paper: Dutch disease, three forms of overspending and the crowding out effect, and
population growth rate as it affects GDP per capita. These theories often examine phenomena that are not
taken into account when correlating data empirically and thus it is important to introduce these so they
can be addressed as explanations for specific data patterns. The empirical section of this paper will aim to
illustrate how hosting a mega event would help or hurt a city/country measured against an averaged
timeline of gross domestic product per capita growth.
Dutch disease is a theory that encompasses the idea of a quick unsustainable surge in economic
spending. Initially, Dutch disease was first developed in the 1960s when the discovery of Natural gas
generated a sharp inflow of currency. This quick inflow of currency lead to very high currency
appreciation, which made the country’s other products less price competitive in the forex market. In this
case, a short run tourism spike as well as foreign investment are natural occurrences when hosting a mega
sport event. This sharp increase in expenditure is, in most cases, unsustainable after hosting the event and
ends up hurting the rest of the export products for the host country. Analogous to a sugar high, the body
feels amazing for a short amount of time until the sugar is completely processed. At the end of the spike,
the body regresses to feeling sluggish and takes a few hours to produce the necessary amount of
endorphins to make a person feel ‘normal’ again. This empirical section of this paper will be essentially
testing this theory: after the initial spike, a natural downturn in exports will occur due to appreciate
currency. Is there a correlation in certain characteristics that allow for certain countries to recover from
this natural downturn and perform better in the long run?
The crowding out effect will be measured in three aspects: one with regards to the displacement
of routine tourists; the second with regards to an overestimation of the purchasing of tourism products;
and the third with regards to overshadowing large government spending. The late half of (Northern
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Hemisphere) spring and summer are the natural traveling periods for most tourists around the world.
Europe is habitually visited when a down-jacket is maximum layer required and South America is more
frequently visited when the temperature is less than 100 degrees. Normally, Europe receives around 670
million tourists per year with nearly 60% during those time periods and South America also receives
roughly 60% of their 100 million of their annual tourists during those seasons as well. With the exception
of the winter Olympic Games, the Summer Olympics and World Cup normally happen during those
months of frequent international travel. Michael Overmyer authored a thesis about the displacement of
tourists from the London 2012 Olympic Games opinionating that London might have actually been better
off had it not hosted the event.17 A city’s hotels and restaurants are often at capacity with sports fans, and
had those same hotel rooms and restaurants been full of business executives or routine vacationers, the
tournament may not have resulted in a short-run net increase in economic activity. His article indicates
the primary idealism of the crowding out effect where the influx of tourists caused a less-than-expected
number of tourists the year the Olympics occurred. Pre-tournament tourism predictions were clearly
overstated as seasonal vacationers cannot be considered if they are displaced. Mr. Overmyer also noted
that this displacement of tourists during the event effected the number of routine tourists a year postevent. Tourists who believe the host city will be too crowded look for other places to vacation and thus
the following when the tournament effects become minimal, the host would actually lose cyclic tourists.
The second illustration of the crowding out effect come due to an excessive amount of spending
on tourism products. Naturally, as a demand for a product increases or the supply of the product
decreases, its price will decrease incentivizing consumers to purchase less. There are a couple possibilities
as to why this occurs during a mega sports event: a monopolized market for tourism products and a fixed
supply of products. As visitors influx into the host economy, the sellers can essentially charge an
exorbitant price they desire. Tourists, many traveling internationally, are likely to still buy the
memorabilia offered at the event making tourism products a slightly more inelastic good in the beginning.
On the other hand, however, local demand of the memorabilia will likely be displaced by the tourists
purchases. The other possibility is that the host economy vendors have a select supply of goods and thus
as the supply decreases with each purchase, the price of such products increases. For this example, it will
be assumed that there not a fixed supply of tourist products. Figure 5 below illustrates the crowding out
effect’s impact on the demand for tourism products and thus the resulting long term consequences as
more expenditure occurs.

17
Overmyer, M.; Grand Valley State University; Economic Impact Analysis on Olympic Host-Cities;
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honorsprojects

26

Figure 5

The figure above illustrates the long term potential changes in demand and supply to tourism
products due to a country’s hosting of an event.18 In this figure, tourism products are represented as a
single market commodity. D0 is the initial downward sloping demand curve and S0 is the initial upward
sloping supply curve. Another simplification, we assume that the D0 curve only includes local residents
and the S0 curve only consists of local producers. Point (P0, Q0) represents the initial market equilibrium
where P0 is the equilibrium price and Q0 is the initial equilibrium quantity. Consumer incentive to buy can
be captured by the area P0eh and producer surplus can be represented by the area P0ae.
Hosting a mega sport event causes an outward shift in the demand curve due to arrival of tourists.
This shift brings the new equilibrium to the point (P1, Q1). A shift in the demand curve lessens the
incentive to consumers to purchase tourist products as the price increases (area P1jg). This change in the
consumer surplus affects both residential and tourist expenditures. Just as locals would be less
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incentivized to purchase high priced items, purchases by regularly-travelled tourists would likely be
displaced due to the increase in price.
As the price increases, the producer incentive to keep supplying products into the market decreases. This
can only be remedied by attracting more tourists with a higher willingness to pay (who are price inelastic)
than those being displaced. Depending on the place, the event may attract more than leisure vacationers
such as business executives or convention delegates, who commonly spend more than the average
vacationer (Solberg, Andersson, Shibli, 2001).19 If the venue fails to attract these types of consumers with
deeper pockets, then fewer commodities will be purchased.
The subsequent shift in the tourism product market is an outward shift in the supply curve from
S0 to S1. As producers see the influx of tourists purchasing goods, they become more optimistic and
supply more product to match the demand of the consumers. This positive shift in the supply curve will
lower the price equilibrium price and increase the quantity of goods bought to the new equilibrium (P2,
Q2). The supply curve needs to be shifted such that the new price is equal to the initial price (P0) to
simplify the progressing theory. This shift hypothetically compensates for the crowding-out effect from
the previous demand curve shift. Despite the initial simplification of having the demand curve only apply
to local consumers, this would likely not be the case. In reality, the initial demand curve, D0, would
contain tourists where producers would only logically only supply more goods with the confidence that
the products will be bought by incoming consumers. The consumer surplus has increased to the area of
P2di, but the aggregate consumer surplus will have increased to the original level. The price reduction
increases the quantity of goods traded but lessens the amount of revenue generated per item exchanged.
The final stage of the long term analysis in the displacement of tourism product expenditure is the
final inward shift in demand. Long term assumes that the event has passed and tourism is fading out
significantly. While it can be assumed that a lack of tourists would allow for local residents, the test
subject in the displayed model, to purchase more goods, the ultimate lack in promotion (of the product)
and ‘buzz’ surrounding the event would have died out leaving the products less desirable. Realistically,
the initial demand curve, D0, would have included tourists, thus as tourists leave the host country, there
will be a heavy decrease in the amount of consumers. The demand curve is allowed to shift back to the
starting position D0=D2 to simplify the theory. This implies and important assumption that there are no
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legacies, implicit externalities, surrounding the event. To be clear, legacies are an important part to a host
country, but are nearly impossible to calculate and are not implemented into this theoretical model.
The third illustration of the crowding out effect: an alternate direction of expenditure where the
government could have invested its billions of currency on other city projects instead of on the specific
event. Logically, the initial increase in GDP, income, and thus raised taxes would allow for a larger
government budget. If the government had decided to not to invest in event infrastructure, but rather
natural infrastructure (i.e. freeways) or improving other means of transportation. Without the event, the
government would have spent money on numerous other projects, which theoretically would have still
improved the aggregate gross domestic product of the country. Who’s to say this would not have been the
more efficient and beneficial option? Hypothetically had the event not occurred, London could have spent
the billions of investment money on other pressing projects.
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Connection to the Empirical Model:
Theory would naturally suggest that a host of such an event as the World Cup, Summer
Olympics, or Winter Olympics would incur a positive short term boost in the country’s gross domestic
product per capita due to excessive spending (C), Investment (I), Government spending (G), and a
positive change in New Exports (NX). Not taking into account any legacy, externalities, or implicit
benefits, the following figure (Figure 6) illustrates what is generally hypothesized from the data gathered
from each of the events. It is hypothesized that the host country will incur a short-run boost in economic
activity surrounding the time of the event.

Figure 6

Macroeconomic theory would suggest that, holding the total population of a country constant, the
host economy would experience a short-term boost due to expected increases in aggregate consumption
and government spending. As tourism dissipates, this expected boost is suggested to leave with it and
would thusly cause an overall decreasing of the GDPPC growth rate. The empirical portion of this paper
will test (with data from the World Bank) the validity of the theory.
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This model will make a parallel trends assumption which insinuates that the difference between
the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group will remain constant over time. The figure above illustrates the initial
difference as zero but will be represented by an interactive variable, which will be explained further in the
next section. It is hypothesized that at Time = 0, the short term tangible benefits will come into full effect
within a year and shift the intercept and slope the GDPPC of the host country by the start of a year after
the event (Time = 1). One factor that is not accurately displayed in the graph above is that it is expected
that the slope of the GDPPC curve will eventually begin to level out (similar to that of a Solow growth
output curve) versus keeping its new steep shape (from the Time = 1 ‘jump’). On the other hand, it is
expected that the non-host country GDPPC will neither change in slope or intercept as it has not
undertaken or invested in any substantial event that would allow for a drastic change in its GDPPC. The
aforementioned hypothesis will be tested with data from a twenty year (long run) period per event in
attempt to answer the question of whether or not it is worth it to host a mega sport event.

*Note: that the theoretical model and empirical are separate entities. The theoretical model speculates what should happen in the
short run, according to economic theory, if a country decided to host a mega sport event. The empirical model will test the validity
of the macroeconomic theory against the data in the short and long run where the effects of such can also be seen by the β5 and β6
variables. *
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Data Set:
In order to determine the positive or negative impact on host countries’ gross domestic product
per capita levels, data was obtained from the World Bank. World Bank data was used for the sole reason
that it was the platform that had the largest amount of consistent data. Other data platforms charged fees,
or had very incomplete data sets with ten to twenty year gaps. The World Bank data was not perfect and
other sources (Statista and FED) were sought out to complete the remaining gaps. The fully constructed
data set of this thesis is comprised of three separate subsidiary data sets of all mega-sport tournaments
(World Cup, Summer Olympics, and Winter Olympics) from 1960 until present date. Each data set is
comprised of the annual gross domestic product per country of the host and runner-up countries. The first
data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding the World Cup hosts and runner-up countries from
the bidding process. The second data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding the Summer
Olympic hosts and runner-up countries. The third data set consists of the annual macro data surrounding
the Winter Olympics hosts and runner-up countries.
The empirical section of this thesis will be used to test the validity of the suggested outcome
theorized from basic macroeconomic influences and determine if host countries, on average, perform
better/reach higher economic standing in the long-run. The dependent variable used to judge the impact
on the host country is the gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) to capture the macroeconomic
standing of a country incorporating its population. Time will also be accounted for in this model in two
respects: (i) a normal progression to account for GDP’s natural correlation over time; and (ii) to account
for four major events that severely affected the world economy. A set of binary variables will be used to
simplify the effect of a country hosting versus not hosting an event where the host retains a ‘1 value’ and
a non-host retains a ‘0 value.’ A set of interactive independent variables will be generated from
multiplying the dummy variables with Time to create the necessary distinction of a difference-indifference model. This will be explained further in the next section. The final component of the data is a
set of macro-variable controls such as a country’s population, interest, and inflation rate. Originally, a few
more control variables were to be used but the downside is that as these variables trend over time, they
would mitigate the visual effects of the binary and interactive independent variables. The Parallel Trends
assumption is already implicit, thus only a select few number of controls will be used in the empirical
regressions. In other words, a fairly large assumption of the data will already be made to capture all the
differences in the data (from the interactive variable) versus having the controls overshadow the answer to
the question.
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The empirical section of this thesis will utilize a difference-in-difference (DID) model. It is a
quasi-experimental technique that uses longitudinal data (against time) from treatment versus control
groups to obtain an appropriate counterfactual and measure a casual effect.20 The basic idea is to compare
the treatment group and the control group before and after the stimulus. In this model, the treatment group
are all the host cities and countries of either an Olympic Games or World Cup and the control group are
the runner-up cities that were unable to host the event. Should it be found that the runner-up hosted the
event later on, the runner-up was replaced with another (runner-up) country that displayed a similar
GDPPC growth rate as the host country.
In order to estimate any casual effect from a sudden stimulus, three assumptions must hold:
exchangeability, positivity, and a Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption. In this model a fourth
assumption must also hold: Parallel Trends in outcome. This assumption ensures internal validity of the
difference-in-difference model where it requires that the difference between the ‘treatment’ and control
group is constant over time. It is imperative that this assumption hold such that violation of the
assumption would lead to a biased estimation of the casual effect.
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Variable List
Dependent Variable:
GDPPC: (Gross domestic product per capita) A measure of a country's economic output accounting for
its number of people
Independent Variables:
Time:
Time: progression of years from t=0 per the year 1960.
Time2, Time3, Time4: 1st-4th degree polynomials in time.
Event_year: accounts for years preceding and post event.
Event_timeline: timeline established of 10 years before the event to 10 years post event.
Host_announced: whether or not a country will host the event activated when host country is announced
to the host and public. Captures the amount of prep time a host has prior to the event. 1=country selected
to host, 0=not selected.
Binary Comparisons:
Host_wc: whether or not a country hosts a World Cup Event. 1= host, 0 = not host
Host_wc: whether or not a country hosts the Summer Olympic Games. 1= host, 0 = not host
Host_wo: whether or not a country hosts the Winter Olympic Games. 1= host, 0 = not host
Post_wc: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for
non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host
Post_so: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for
Summer Olympics non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host
Post_wo: whether or not a country successfully hosts the event. Accounts for difference in intercept for
Winter Olympics non-hosts. 1= host, 0 = not host
Interactive Variables:
Time_Post_wc: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the World Cup.
Time_Post_so: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the Summer Olympics.
Time_Post_wo: Captures the Pre-Post time trend difference for the non-hosts of the Winter Olympics.
Time_host_post_wc: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in World Cup host GDPPC
compared to non-host GDPPC over time.
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Time_host_post_so: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in Summer Olympics host
GDPPC compared to non-host GDPPC over time.
Time_host_post_wo: Captures the difference of the change (diff in diff) in Winter Olympics host
GDPPC compared to non-host GDPPC over time.
Host_post_wc: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between World Cup hosts
versus non-hosts.
Host_post_so: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between Summer Olympics
hosts versus non-hosts.
Host_post_wo: Captures intercept difference in GDPPC ‘jump’ over one year between Winter Olympics
hosts versus non-hosts.
*Did not interact Host_time where the interaction that would represent the difference in time trend for hosts and non-hosts prior to the
event. Not including it shows parallel trends assumption and allows for diff in diff approach.

Controls:
Total_Population: Total population of a country.
Gov_spending_gdp_ratio: fractional amount of government expenditure compared to a country’s gross
domestic product.
Real_interst_rate: aggregate rate of a proportion of a loan charged as interest to the borrower adjusted
for inflation.
Inflation_rate: is the percent growth in the price levels from the previous year.
Broad_money_billions: the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the
central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the
central government; bank and traveler’s checks; and other securities such as certificates of deposit and
commercial paper.
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Difference-in-Difference Model
Table 1:
Treatment Group

Control Group

Pre-Stimulus

Treatment*pre

Control*pre

Post-Stimulus

Treatment*post

Control*post

Intuitively, a difference-in-difference is a comparison of four cell-level means where only once cell is
treated per regression.21 When this occurs, it can be simplified to the [treatment*post-stimulus], which is
essentially an interactive independent variable in a simple OLS regression. A typical regression of this
model should be shown as followed at the minimum:
Yi,t = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Post_Stimulus] + β3[Host*Post_Stimulus] + β4*[Control] + εt
Where:
Post_Stimulus is an indicator = 1 when t=0
B3 is the coefficient of interest (the treatment effect)
Time is the time trend
Control are various independent bases
εt is the random error term

21
Jagielka, P., Ozier, O.; University of Maryland, College Park; Applied Econometrics: Difference-in-Difference Estimation;
http://economics.ozier.com/econ626/lec/econ626lecture3_handout.pdf
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To allow for the differences in intercepts and time trends, this method has been adapted to create a triple
interaction between the independent variables where Time and whether or not a country hosted the event
have to be taken into account. This thesis-specific regression is as shown without controls:
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] +
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + εt
Where:
GDPPCt = gross domestic product per capita per country
Host is binary for hosting an event
Time is an annual progression from t =0 to t = 64
2

3

Time , Time , and Time4 are fourth degree polynomial terms in the time trend to account for
possible changes to the GDPPC slope
Post is binary hosting an event and accounts for extra event stimulus
Time*Post is the primary difference between hosts v. non-hosts
Time*Host*Post is the difference in pre-post time trend differences for hosts and non-hosts
Post*Host is the primary change in GDPPC slopes
εt is the random error term

*Did not interact Host_time where the interaction that would represent the difference in time trend for hosts and non-hosts prior to the
event. Not including it shows parallel trends assumption and allows for diff in diff approach.

Thesis-specific regression with controls:
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] +
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + β7[Total_population] + β8[Inflation_rate] + εt
Where:
Total_population is the country initial population at the time of the event
Inflation-rate is the country inflation rate at the time of the event
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Gross domestic product per capita has often been thought to be a better indicator of the
development of an economy as it takes into account in the population versus just an aggregate of total
goods bought and sold. Often times, a country’s gross domestic product can be due to size of the country.
The total population (at the time of the event) allows for the control of the initial state of the economy to
ensure a better estimation of tourism effects. The inflation rate was also included as a key control to
account for the purchasing power in the host country’s economy. The inclusion of the total population and
inflation improved the R2 (linear indicator) value but, as predicted, made most of the interactive variable
coefficients insignificant. This may be due to increased multicollinearity, but further research would
suggest that the inclusion of these controls simply overshadowed the impact of the interactive variables of
interest. This is partially why more macro-variable controls were not included. Since GDP trends over
time (serial correlation is almost certain) with these macro-variable controls, it was likely that these
controls would improve the linear significance but would mitigate the diff-in-diff effects.
The regressions were created to illustrate the full impact of hosting a mega-sport event. The
βHost variable is a summation of the βPost and βPost*Host variables where βPost and βPost*Host
indicate the difference between hosting and not hosting the event. When ‘time’ is factored in, then this
allows for the calculation of GDP per capita growth where the summation of βTime*Post and
βTime*Host*Post are equal to the aggregate effect on the long-term growth GDP per capita growth rate.
Theory would indicate that the overall effect should be positive, but literature would indicate otherwise.
The manufactured regressions were set up to indicate what parts of the ‘full impact’ cause the difference
between what theory suggests than what literature concludes.
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Methodology
The theory previously stated suggests that a positive relationship should occur between GDPPC
and hosting a mega-sport event. Referring to previous research, however, long-run graphs showing ten
years before and after the mega-sport events were hosted illustrate that runner-up countries fared better
than the host countries of the Olympics (Figure 1).
Subsequently, regressions were run to test the theory. Since there were three events, the
regressions were run individually to ensure a better estimation of the effect of hosting the individual
events. This also allows for an easier analysis of the effect on a country’s GDP per capita of each event.
For each of the three events, two regressions were performed: one without controls to measure the full
consequence of hosting the event and the other with controls. These regressions were as follows:
OLS1: World Cup no controls
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_wc] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_wc]
+ β4[Time*Post_wc] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wc] + β6[Post*Host_wc] + εt
OLS2: World Cup no controls
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_wc] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_wc]
+ β4[Time*Post_wc] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wc] + β6[Post*Host_wc] + β7[Total_population] +
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt
OLS3: Summer Olympics no controls
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_so] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_so]
+ β4[Time*Post_so] + β5[Time*Host*Post_so] + β6[Post*Host_so] + εt
OLS4: Summer Olympics with controls
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_so] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_so]
+ β4[Time*Post_so] + β5[Time*Host*Post_so] + β6[Post*Host_so] + β7[Total_population] +
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt
OLS5: Winter Olympics no controls
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host_wo] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_wo]
+ β4[Time*Post_wo] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wo] + β6[Post*Host_wo] + εt

OLS6: Winter Olympics with controls
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host_wo] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post_wo]
+ β4[Time*Post_wo] + β5[Time*Host*Post_wo] + β6[Post*Host_wo] + β7[Total_population] +
β8[Inflation_rate] + εt
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After the results were obtained, several tests were conducted to examine the possible extent of
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and serial correlation. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the spread of
the error term, GDPPC, is related to the values of an independent variable. In other words, the variance of
the error term (at the end of the regression equation) is changing, which alters the significance of the
results and hypothesis testing. Multicollinearity is problematic because it increases the chance of
identifying a relevant variable as insignificant within the model. It is likely that this model will have some
multicollinearity since many of the control variables may trend over time. Gross domestic product is a
macroeconomic variable that depends on its value from the previous period; therefore, the data will likely
exhibit serial correlation. Since no variables can be omitted without unsatisfying the basic necessities of
performing a standard difference-in-difference OLS regression, the final model can only be corrected for
the aforementioned variations of econometric assumptions. The only independent variables that will be
omitted from the final model are the control variables, total population and inflation rate, to capture the
full possible impact of a country hosting a mage-sport event.
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Results:
i. Descriptive Statistics:
Descriptive statistics provide insight into the sample used in the study. The mean, median,
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation (CV%) all reveal some different
aspects of variables in the sample. The statistics for each of the events with and without controls are
displayed below: Tables 2-5.
The coefficient of variation (CV%) represents the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean and
is used when comparing the degree of variation from one data series to another. Since the increased
spread decreases the standard error of the coefficient, an independent variable with a high CV% value
will have a decreased standard error and a higher t-statistic. Thus, the CV% value can be used to predict
whether or not a variable may be significant when included in the model. Although none of the variables
will be removed from the model, apart from the controls, these significant suggestions can be concluded
in further analysis and discussion of the final-adjusted model.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP

Mean
GDPPC
TIME
HOST_WC
POST_WC

9953.595
31.68443
0.526639
0.522541

Median
4596.88
33
1
1

Maximum
48603.48
57
1
1

Minimum
341.5928
0
0
0

Std.
Dev.
11617.22
14.13759
0.499802
0.500004

CV%

Sum

117%
45%
95%
96%

4857354
15462
257
255

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.57E+10
97337.4
121.6537
121.752

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP
WITH CONTROLS
GDPPC
TIME
HOST_WC
POST_WC
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

10797.03
32.79814
0.545244
0.522042
-0.06033
8875.49
75173651
12.79106

5617.742
34
1
1
0
2982
56797087
5.017158

48603.48
57
1
1
10
48603.48
2.93E+08
874.2457

341.5928
0
0
0
-10
341.5928
22037610
-1.352837

12058.07
13.61236
0.498527
0.500094
5.935003
12935.14
56794476
48.05608

CV%
112%
42%
91%
96%
146%
76%
376%

Sum
4653520
14136
235
225
-26
3825336
3.24E+10
5512.946

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.25E+10
79677.44
106.8677
107.5406
15146.43
7.19E+10
1.39E+18
993036.3
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: WORLD CUP
Mean
GDPPC
TIME
HOST_SO
POST_SO

Median

23691.32
37.19753
0.5
0.506173

22061.16
37.5
0.5
1

Maximum
60283.25
57
1
1

Minimum
828.5805
14
0
0

Std. Dev.

CV%

13955.76
10.36118
0.500773
0.500735

59%
28%
100%
99%

Sum
7675987
12052
162
164

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.29E+10
34675.36
81
80.98765

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: SUMMER
OLYMPICS WITH
CONTROLS

GDPPC
TIME
HOST_SO
POST_SO
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

Mean

Median

20317.79
32
0.5
0.52381
0
10920.78
93231492
4.398682

20087.54
32
0.5
1
0
9646.252
57482591
3.127596

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

CV%

51936.89
50
1
1
10
19115.05
2.98E+08
28.69759

1398.479
14
0
0
-10
1398.479
17065100
-0.12790

11035.55
8.306336
0.501195
0.500626
6.06977
6122.532
84811355
3.869783

Minimum
1148.494

13800.32

65%

6853548

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.11E+10

54%
26%
100%
96%
56%
91%
88%

Sum
4266735
6720
105
110
0
2293365
1.96E+10
923.7231

Sum Sq.
Dev.
2.55E+10
14420
52.5
52.38095
7700
7.83E+09
1.50E+18
3129.82

TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: WINTER
OLYMPICS
Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

CV%

Sum

GDPPC

21284.31

20670.82

Maximum
57579.5

TIME

31.13354

31

54

8

10.23086

33%

10025

33599.26

HOST_WO
POST_WO

0.521739
0.546584

1
1

1
1

0
0

0.500305
0.4986

96%
91%

168
176

80.34783
79.80124

Std. Dev.

CV%

TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF
STATISTSICS: WINTER
OLYMPICS WITH CONTROLS
Mean
GDPPC
TIME
HOST_WO
POST_WO
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

22028.39
31.46774
0.541935
0.548387
0.332258
12002
66954272
8.916902

Median
21427.26
31
1
1
1
10587.29
24746500
2.940634

Maximum
57579.5
54
1
1
10
25646.7
2.88E+08
338.4491

Minimum
1148.494
8
0
0
-10
2238.803
3985258
-13.70632

13525.51
10.27694
0.499044
0.498458
6.100766
8037.756
84852574
35.57829

61%
33%
92%
91%
67%
127%
399%

Sum
6828801
9755
168
170
103
3720620
2.08E+10
2764.24

Sum Sq.
Dev.
5.65E+10
32635.18
76.95484
76.77419
11500.78
2.00E+10
2.22E+18
391136.7
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Two types of regressions were run for each of the three types of events. In general, the summary
of statistics would indicate a minimal difference between the aggregated values. The difference in the
means seem to be +/- a standard deviation and the CV-percentage change seems to only vary about five
percent. The negative change in the coefficient of variation-percentage is indicative that the inclusion of
the control variables allow for a more precise estimate of the coefficients where a lessened CV percentage
means that the data is more centered around the regressed expected value (line). This, however would
only further the theory that the inclusion of the control independent variables would only mitigate the
visual effects (in the data) of the stimulus (event) effect. The inclusion of the control variables centers the
data but since these controls move linearly (across time) with GDPPC, it only mitigates the impact of
hosting a mega-sport event.
A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 2-3) of the first regression (World Cup)
exhibits a wide variation in the gross domestic product per capita between both hosts and runner up
countries: a minimum value of $341.59 and a maximum value of $48603.48, and an average of
$10797.03. It is important to mention that these two (hosts and runner-ups) should be able to be
compared because of the parallel trends assumption where the difference in GDPPC slope and intercept
should be mitigated. Concerning the hosts of the World Cup, there is large variation in this number across
the countries where the CV is 117% without controls and 112% with controls. With that said, the
GDPPC_BASE, the gross domestic product per capita at the beginning of the twenty-year period has a
lower GDPPC with a higher CV. One theory driving the difference between the averaged GDPPC and the
averaged base year of GDPPC is overall, the taking on of the bidding process and hosting of the World
Cup not only raised the GDPPC higher than normal inflation would have, but also brought some of the
developing countries closer in GDPPC to being developed. The variance in the CV narrows from the
averaged base year towards the averaged GDPPC, which suggests that countries’ GDPPC are slowly
starting to converge despite only half hosting the World Cup.
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A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 4-5) of the second regression (Summer
Olympics) displays a wide variation in the gross domestic product per capita: a minimum value of
$828.58, a maximum value of $60283.25, and an average of $22061.16. Concerning the hosts of the
Summer Olympics, there is a significantly lessened variation in this number across the countries where
the CV is 59% without controls and 54% with controls. Although both of these values are considered as
not-reasonably high, the still indicate that there is a realistic amount of variation in the data but a
significantly lessened amount than the World Cup. This could merely suggest that more places considered
to host the Summer Olympics were more developed. This is substantiated by the data where the mean
GDPPC_BASE and GDPPC are significantly higher than those representing the World Cup.
A comparison of the summary of statistics (Tables 6-7) of the second regression (Winter
Olympics) indicates a wide variation: a minimum value of $1148.49, a maximum value of $57579.50, and
an average of $21284.31. While the variance is somewhat wide, CV is 65% without controls and 61%
with controls, the GDPPC numbers are significantly higher than either of the other two mega-sport
events. The GDPPC_BASE starts at $12002, over $1000 per capita higher than the Summer Olympic
considered countries and $2000 per capita higher than countries considered to host (and hosts) of the
World Cup. This, in theory, fits where most Winter Olympic hosts are both Nordic, Western Europe, or
North American developed countries and the GDPPC are historically higher.
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Preliminary Model:
World Cup:

The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their
relative insignificance is justified. The Host_WC variable is an indicator of the binary effect of hosting an
event. It is the total intercept difference for hosting an event: B3 + B6. The variable Host_WC = 8535.50
suggests that overall, countries that host the World Cup exhibit a positive $8535.50 difference in their
gross domestic product per capita compared to non-hosts countries. The Post_WC variable indicates the
binary effect of successfully hosting the World Cup. It represents the intercept difference for the non-host.
Post_WC = 3437.06 indicates that on average, non-hosts experience a positive $3437.06 short-term effect
on host GDPPC despite not hosting. This variable is relatively insignificant and will be tested for one of
the econometric assumption violations. The variable Time_Post_WC captures the change in GDPPC
growth non-host countries. Although statistically insignificant, its value of -72.06 indicates that overall,
non-hosts countries exhibit a relatively horizontal (slightly negative) response in the years of not hosting
the World Cup compared to the host countries. The main variable of interest is Time_Host_Post_WC,
which indicates the difference in the change in long-run GDPPC growth. Its value of 699.07 indicates that
overall, host countries exhibit a $699.07 increase in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to
non-host countries. The final variable, Host_Post_WC, represents the difference in difference of the

45
GDPPC intercept of host versus non-host countries. In essence, how much larger or smaller the intercept
jump is (in terms of GDPPC) in that year of hosting the event. Its value of -20673.82 illustrates that on
average, host countries exhibit a negative $2067.82 short-term change in GDPPC. This is surprising
where macroeconomic theory would suggest the exact opposite. Due to a tourism influx, one can expect
an increase aggregate spending in addition to a heavy increase government spending would result in
short-run increase in the aggregate gross domestic product per capita. The data clearly suggests if a
country hosts the World Cup, the resulting stimulation may not impact in the short-run as economic
theory would normally indicate.
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World Cup: With Controls

The differences exhibited in this regression with controls have been restated throughout the paper.
Although the R2 value increases dramatically and the t-statistics became more significant for the most
part, all of the coefficients diminished distinctively. According to the data, all of the control variables
appear to be significant, which intuitively makes sense, as they are macroeconomic independent variables
correlating with the macroeconomic dependent variable across time. The final model will not take into
account the control independent variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive
independent variables is captured.
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Summer Olympics:

The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their
relative insignificance is justified. The variable Host_SO = -10268.28 suggests that overall, countries that
host the World Cup exhibit a negative -$10268.28 difference in their gross domestic product per capita
compared to non-hosts countries. Post_SO = 1409.47 indicates that on average, non-hosts experience a
positive $1409.47 short-term effect on host GDPPC despite not hosting. The variable Time_Post_SO
captures the change in GDPPC growth non-host countries. Although statistically insignificant, its value of
55.58 indicates that overall, non-hosts countries exhibit a relatively horizontal (slightly positive) response
in the years of not hosting the World Cup compared to the host countries. The variable
Time_Host_Post_SO has a value of -296.13, which indicates that overall, host countries exhibit a $296.13 decrease in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to non-host countries. This would
essentially suggest that it is not worth it for countries to host the Summer Olympics. Host_Post_SO
exhibits a value of 6462.09, which illustrates that on average, host countries exhibit a positive $6462.09
short-term change in GDPPC. Despite being insignificant, this positive change is in-line with the
macroeconomic theory. This analysis of the impact of the Summer Olympic Games is somewhat
problematic where most of the variables are insignificant in the model and the binary ‘Host_SO’ variable
is negative.
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Summer Olympics: With Controls

The differences exhibited in this regression with controls have been restated throughout the paper.
Similarly to the World Cup controlled regressions, the R2 value dramatically increased but at the cost of
minimization of the coefficients of the independent variables. The final model will not take into account
the control independent variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive independent
variables is captured.
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Winter Olympics

The first independent variables regarding time are constants to account for in the model, thus their
relative insignificance is justified. The variable Host_WO = -10554.72 suggests that overall, countries
that host the World Cup exhibit a negative -$10554.72 difference in their gross domestic product per
capita compared to non-hosts countries. Post_WO = -42882.61 indicates that on average, non-hosts
experience a negative $42882.61 short-term effect on host GDPPC despite not hosting. The variable
Time_Post_WO exhibited a value of 1302.19 indicates that overall, non-hosts countries exhibit a
$1302.19 postive response in the years of not hosting the World Cup compared to the host countries. The
variable Time_Host_Post_WO has a value of -940.78, which indicates that overall, host countries exhibit
a $940.78 decrease in GDPPC growth over a ten-year span compared to non-host countries. This would
essentially suggest that it is not worth it for countries to host the Winter Olympics. Host_Post_WO
exhibits a value of 36939.058, which illustrates that on average, host countries exhibit a positive
$36939.058 short-term boost in GDPPC. This analysis of the impact of the Winter Olympic Games also
shows that hosting this event would go against general academic macroeconomic theory, but there are
possible theories why. The data essentially indicates that although host countries may fair better in the
short term, the non-host countries experience a better growth in GDPPC over the long-term and that
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hosting of the Winter Olympics is not worth it. One possible theory as to why non-hosts may fair better is
because of the type of countries that are chosen to host. For the most part, developed nations are
considered to host (either host or are the runner-up in bidding) and it may fair that more ‘less-developed’
countries are chosen to host (to hopefully boost their economies). On the average, this would show that
the more developed countries not chosen to host fair better than the ‘less-developed’ nations (I.e. Russia
and South Korea).
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Winter Olympics: With Controls

The differences exhibited in this regression with controls are similar to those above. The R2 value
increased, the t-statistics became partially less significant for the independent variables, while the control
variables show their significance. The coefficient effects are lessened due to the addition of the control
variables where their linear correlation with gross domestic product per capita only improves the value of
the data on the expected value line. The final model will not take into account the control independent
variables to ensure that the full impact of the binary and interactive independent variables is captured.
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Violation of the Assumptions:
World Cup:
White Test:
The White test determines if one or more of the independent variables is causing
heteroscedasticity. In this test, the residuals squared are run as a function of all other independent
variables. A white test performed illustrates the F-statistic of the set of heteroscedastic variables and
probability of the F-statistic being significant. If the probability is less than 0.05 accompanied with a
significant F statistic, then reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the data set has heteroscedasticity.
If heteroscedasticity is found, the model will be corrected using a Newey-West correction.
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
F-statistic = 40.69
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05

Conclusion:
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.
Multicollinearity:
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Multicollinearity:
A way to detect multicollinearity is by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which
estimates the inflation on the standard error of each coefficient due to the presence of multicollinearity. In
short, this test measures the degree to which the variation in an independent variable is explained by the
other independent variables. To calculate VIF, a regression using one independent variable is run against
all remaining independent variables. The R2 for this model is plugged into following equation:
VIF =

#
#$% &

A generated rule of thumb indicates that a VIF value less than five can be accepted as the data not having
any multicollinearity. Some research would suggest that any value less than ten is acceptable as well but
further tests would also have to be utilized. Any value greater than ten essentially signifies that the
variable identified exhibits multicollinearity.

Table 1:
Variable
Host_WC
Post_WC
Time_Post_WC
Time_Host_Post_WC
Host_Post_WC

VIF
2.11
11.44
15.03
13.13
13.89

Conclusion
VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC.
VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC
VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC
VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to
Time_Host_Post_WC
VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC

In conclusion, these calculated VIFS suggest a severe multicollinearity problem throughout the
regression. The normal solution to a multicollinearity problem is to minimize the collinear variables. A
possibly significant error in this model, however, is that since the minimum independent variables for a
diff-in-diff regression have already been met, there is no way to correct for the suggested
multicollinearity.
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Serial Correlation:
Serial correlation occurs when corr(εi, εi-1) ≠ 0, the random error terms from different
observations are correlated. This correlation indicates a pattern across the random error terms and,
therefore, there is a pattern to what should be a random term. Serial correlation does not cause a bias on
the coefficient of the independent variable, but rather may make the coefficients easier to accept.
In any given model, serial correlation might depend upon how the data is organized. Per this
model, it is possible for there to be serial correlation across a region. If a shock had occurred in a region
early in the timeline, then it may influence the error team of the subsequent city but at a later point in
time. More than likely, however, this model displays serial correlation across time where gross domestic
product per capita is naturally a serially correlated variable as it depends on the past period’s value. To
determine if this model exhibits serial correlation, we conduct the Breusch-Godfrey/LM Test. If it is
found, serial correlation can be corrected by and estimating the standard errors using the Newey-West
method.
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Breusch-Godfrey LM Test
The Breusch-Godfrey, or LM Test, is used for determining if there is serial correlation between the error
terms of consecutive periods. In this test, a t-test will be run on the coefficient of the lagged residual. If it
turns out to be significant, then it can be determined that there is serial correlation in the regression.
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0
HA: βResid(-1) > 0
Level of Significance = 5 %
tcritical: 1.960
tcomputed: 46.45
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical

Conclusion:
Reject H0 and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.
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Summer Olympics:
Heteroscedasticity:
White Test
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
F-statistic = 21.52
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05

Conclusion:
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.
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Multicollinearity:

Decision Rule: Acceptable VIF values < 10 < definite multicollinearity
Table 2:
Host_WC

6.62

VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC.

Post_WC

64.09

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC

Time_Post_WC

78.86

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC

Time_Host_Post_WC

37.40

Host_Post_WC

38.06

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to
Time_Host_Post_WC
VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC
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Serial Correlation: Correction with Newey-West
Breusch-Godfrey LM test
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0
HA: βResid(-1) > 0
Level of Significance = 5 %
tcritical: 1.960
tcomputed: 42.06
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical

Conclusion:
Reject Ho and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.
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Winter Olympics:
Heteroscedasticity:
White Test:
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
F-statistic = 9.97
Prob(F-Statistic) = 0.00
Reject Ho if Prob(F-statistic) < 0.05

Conclusion:
Reject H0 and conclude that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.
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Multicollinearity:

Decision Rule: Acceptable VIF values < 10 < definite multicollinearity
Table 3:
Host_WC

5.78

VIF < 10.0 suggests there is no multicollinearity due to Host_WC.

Post_WC

201.23

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Post_WC

Time_Post_WC

192.77

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Time_Post_WC

Time_Host_Post_WC

73.51

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to
Time_Host_Post_WC

Host_Post_WC

114.61

VIF > 10.0 suggests there is multicollinearity due to Host_Post_WC
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Serial Correlation: Correction with Newey-West
Breusch-Godfrey LM test
H0: βResid(-1) ≤ 0
HA: βResid(-1) > 0
Level of Significance = 5 %
tcritical: 1.960
tcomputed: 34.58
Decision rule: reject if tcomputed> tcritical

Conclusion:
Reject Ho and conclude that there is serial correlation in the model.
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Final Model:
The final model will not include any of the control variables to show the full impact of hosting a
mega sport event. Previous analysis of regressions with the control variables illustrated that they lessened
the effect of the binary and interactive independent variables. The final model also employs the
Newey_West method to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Newey-West method
produces standard errors for coefficients estimated by an OLS regression where the error structure is
assumed heteroscedastic and somewhat serially correlated up to a determined lag. The traditional route in
correcting for multicollinearity would be to limit the number of irrelevant variables. The final model uses
the minimum amount of independent variables needed to satisfy the diff-in-diff requirement.
World Cup:
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Variable Interpretation:
βHost_WC = 8535.50; On average, the host country experienced a positive $8535.50 impact on its
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.
βPost_WC = 3437.06; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $3437.06 change in GDPPC
over a twenty-year period.
βTime_Post_WC = -72.06; On average, the non-host country exhibits a slight negative $72.06 change in
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.
βTime_Host_Post_WC = 699.07; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $699.07 difference in
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.
βHost_Post_WC = -20673.82; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $20673.82 difference in
short-term GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period.
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Summer Olympics:

Variable Interpretation:
βHost_SO = -10268.28; On average, the host country experienced a negative $10268.28 impact on its
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.
βPost_SO = 1409.47; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $1409.47 change in GDPPC
over a twenty-year period.
βTime_Post_SO = 55.58; On average, the non-host country exhibits a slight positive $55.58 change in
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.
βTime_Host_Post_SO = -296.13; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $296.13 difference in
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.
βHost_Post_SO = 6462.09; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $6462.09 difference in shortterm GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period.
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Winter Olympics:

Variable Interpretation:
βHost_WO = -10554.72; On average, the host country experienced a negative $10554.72impact on its
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.
βPost_WO = -42882.61; On average, the non-host country exhibits a negative $42882.61change in
GDPPC over a twenty-year period.
βTime_Post_WO = 1302.19; On average, the non-host country exhibits a positive $1302.19 change in
GDPPC growth over a twenty-period.
βTime_Host_Post_WO = -940.78; On average, the host country exhibits a negative $940.78 difference in
GDPPC growth compared to a non-host country over a twenty-year period.
βHost_Post_WO = 36939.12; On average, the host country exhibits a positive $36939.12 difference in
short-term GDPPC change compared to non-host countries over a one-year period.
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Conclusion: Is it worth it to host a mega-sport event?
Preceding analysis provides insight into the theoretical and empirically measured impact of
hosting a mega sport event. Unlike previous literature that only measure one event, this thesis empirically
measured the effect across all three of the mega-sport events: World Cup, Summer Olympics, and Winter
Olympics. Due to this, it is possible to not only conclude if this billion-dollar investment is worth it, but
what type of event would best be host if a country decided to host one. Previous literature and basic
macroeconomic theory have allowed for the drawing of a uniform hypothesis on the ten-year impact of
hosting this type of event: the massive heighten of expenditure in preparation for the events accompanied
with a generous influx of tourism would create a short run burst of economic activity with slight leveling
off of GDPPC curve (slope) in the long run. To test this theory, three empirical regressions were run to
measure the full impact of hosting the games and three more were run to test the impact of
macroeconomic control variables.
It was determined empirically that overall, a mega-sport event is not the most efficient use of
resources and is probably not worth the investment. One of the exceptions to this, however, is dependent
on the type of economy hosting the event: developed versus developing. Previous literature suggests that
hosting a mega-sport event is only an investment that should be made by developed countries and that the
risk of investment is significantly higher for developing countries. Developing countries usually lack the
base resources to host such a tournament and end up incurring the incurred startup costs in infrastructure,
which are already hard enough to overcome. Developed countries, on the other hand, are usually
somewhat prepared with having multiple sports arenas and developed cities that could be easily
refurbished or already are state-of-the-art. Since infrastructure is the largest investment any country or
city has to sustain, developed countries spend millions of dollars less in aggregate versus the developing
countries. Therefore, developed economies generally begin from a place of economic neutrality versus
that of the underdeveloped economy/country.
It can also be determined from the empirical model that if an attempt to host such an event did
occur, then the best option would be to host the World Cup. It is a substantially larger event compared to
either of the Olympic Games and would yield significantly more tangible benefits (revenue). Results
indicated that although there may be a slight economic downturn relative to investment surrounding the
event, countries that hosted the event yielded a significantly higher GDPPC growth curve over a ten-year
span after hosting the World Cup. The Olympic Games, although almost requiring almost as much
funding and preparation costs, are city or county specific and thus yield a fraction of the benefits. One of
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the downfalls is the Olympic Games’ city-specific nature of the event is that the event is city-specific
where it is unlikely that the revenue would spread beyond thirty miles outside the city. The lack of widespread economic activity over the entire country is what can be captured and evaluated by the regression
analysis. If city data had been used, the results may have been slightly different. Based on country data,
however, it can be theorized that hosting the World Cup would be the best option.
Upon meeting and discussing this thesis results with economists Dr. Thomas Miceli, Mr. Victor
Matheson, Mr. Andrew Zimbalist, we decided to create a theoretical model that couple possibly resolve
some of the issues surrounding hosting the Olympic Games. Since the econometric analysis indicated that
hosting the World Cup could end up benefiting the host nation, some of the principles of the World Cup
were adapted to an Olympic model. Some aspects that cannot be avoided or changed include: security,
transportation, and events themselves. The major issues surrounding the Olympics, however, rest in sportspecific infrastructure, size, and centralization. When considering sport specific infrastructure, this
ultimately comes down to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) choosing hosts that are already
better prepared. This reflects on Victor Matheson’s theory that developing countries should not use
hosting a mega-sport event as opportunities to bolster their economies. The size of the competition has
more to do with the duration of the event versus the international recognition. It will be assumed that
these types of events already capture the attention of the world and thus do not need extra marketing.
Certain events cannot be made longer where almost every race is a medal event with the preceding event
the qualifying for the medal round. What could happen is that more time is allotted between each event
where this would also give athletes extra time to rest. The largest issue with the Olympic Games is its
centralization. History recognizes the Olympic Games as a tournament celebrating a coming together of
athletes to show a lack in differences among people. This is what all the athletes stay in the Olympic
village and compete in a maximum of four locations (with the exception of soccer and occasional other
field sports). A brief note about this: The Olympics has a history of this and people like to preserve
history, but any athlete competing international sporting event is respected based on his or her
performance. If a city wants to successfully host the Olympics, history may need to be forgone in order to
maximize business, as hosting mega-sport events have become a business decision.
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The proposed adapted model is the decentralization of the competitions (not the opening
ceremony) such that competitions are paired by rank and location. This way, an A-rank sport (Women’s
Volleyball) is in the same city (location) as a B-rank Sport (Fencing, Judo) and a C-rank rank sport
(speed-walking) to attract an evenly distributed amount of tourism. This also makes revenue streams
easier where consumers can buy single event or a package of tickets based on location such that host
would create a boosted viewership and revenue on the non-A-rank sports.22 This would theoretically spur
economic activity in different places, which improves money-in-circulation and thus would increase those
macroeconomic variables. The incurred costs of security and transportation would increase but these costs
can be spread out over other cities such that one city is not suffering all of them. In theory, this could
increase revenue and spread out the cost of hosting where the event is larger and longer, and would retain
more tourism to yield an evener and wider boost in economic activity.

22

Victor Matheson, Andrew Zimbalist, Thomas Miceli; “Olympics Lecture” (University of Connecticut Law, April 12th, 2019.)
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Errors and Possible Deviations:
Possibilities and limitations of these results include: variation of destinations of the hosted events,
empirical errors, and data retained. The reason the data could be skewed in favor of hosting the World
Cup is because there is a larger variation in the types of countries that hosted the event: countries that
hosted are on the upper scale of developing or developed. Therefore, the model would show a positive
difference when comparing hosts to non-hosts. Summer Olympics and Winter Olympic hosts have less
differences in GDPPC level between hosts and non-hosts; in fact, more developing countries or less
developed countries hosted the Winer Olympics. Therefore, intuitively it would make sense that nonhosts would fair just as well if not better than the hosts. Empirical error is always something to be
accounted for and is another term for human error. The data retained was from the World Bank, if the
source of that data is skewed, then this thesis results would also be incorrect.
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Appendix:
Appendix A: Economic Figures:
Literature Review: Host GDPPC v. Runner-Up

Real Money Market

L’(i,Y)
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Tourism Supply and Demand: Crowding Out Effect

Appendix B: Supportive Figures
Infrastructure Timeline:

Infrastructure Type:
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Appendix C: Graphical Hypothesis

Appendix D: Tables
Difference-in-Difference Model
Treatment Group

Control Group

Pre-Stimulus

Treatment*pre

Control*pre

Post-Stimulus

Treatment*post

Control*post

Appendix E: Equations
Sample Diff-in-Diff
Yi,t = β0 + β1[Time] + β2[Post_Stimulus] + β3[Time*Post_Stimulus] + β4*[Control] + εt
Thesis Regression:
GDPPCt = β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] +
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + εt
Thesis Regression with Controls:
GDPPCt β0 + β1[Host] + β2[Time] + 𝛿 1[Time2] + 𝛿 1[Time3] + 𝛿 1[Time4] + β3[Post] + β4[Time*Post] +
β5[Time*Host*Post] + β6[Post*Host] + β7[Total_population] + β8[Inflation_rate] + εt
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Appendix F: Descriptive Statistics
OLS1_NO_CONTROLS_WC
Mean
GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_WC
POST_WC
TIME_POST_WC
TIME_HOST_POST_WC
HOST_POST_WC

Median

9953.595
31.68443
1203.365
50289.87
2229374
0.526639
0.522541
18.42828
9.829918

4596.88
33
1089
35937
1185921
1
1
13
0

Maximum
48603.48
57
3249
185193
10556001
1
1
57
57

0.272541

0

1

Std.
Dev.
11617.22
14.13759
884.8115
48622.99
2607402
0.499802
0.500004
20.13035
17.4287

CV%

Sum

Minimum
341.5928
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

117%
45%
74%
97%
117%
95%
96%
109%
177%

4857354
15462
587242
24541458
1.09E+09
257
255
8993
4797

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.57E+10
97337.4
3.81E+08
1.15E+12
3.31E+15
121.6537
121.752
197347.5
147930.9

0

0.445724

164%

133

96.75205

OLS1_WCONTROLS_WC

GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_WC
POST_WC
TIME_POST_WC
TIME_HOST_POST_WC
HOST_POST_WC
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

10797.03
32.79814
1260.585
52814.92
2338350
0.545244
0.522042
19.12993
10.4594
0.280742
-0.06033
8875.49
75173651
12.79106

5617.742
34
1156
39304
1336336
1
1
14
0
0
0
2982
56797087
5.017158

48603.48
57
3249
185193
10556001
1
1
57
57
1
10
48603.48
2.93E+08
874.2457

341.5928
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-10
341.5928
22037610
-1.352837

12058.07
13.61236
866.6131
48100.09
2595047
0.498527
0.500094
20.58893
18.08951
0.449884
5.935003
12935.14
56794476
48.05608

CV%
112%
42%
69%
91%
111%
91%
96%
108%
173%
160%
146%
76%
376%

Sum
4653520
14136
543312
22763232
1.01E+09
235
225
8245
4508
121
-26
3825336
3.24E+10
5512.946

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.25E+10
79677.44
3.23E+08
9.95E+11
2.90E+15
106.8677
107.5406
182278.7
140709
87.03016
15146.43
7.19E+10
1.39E+18
993036.3

OLS2_NO_CONTROLS_SO
GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_SO
POST_SO
TIME_POST_SO
TIME_HOST_POST_SO
HOST_POST_SO

Mean

Median

23691.32
37.19753
1713.988
76462.94
3540773
0.5
0.506173
21.14815
10.57407
0.253086

22061.16
37.5
1640.5
66460.5
2692881
0.5
1
24.5
0
0

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

CV%

Sum

60283.25
57
3481
205379
12117361
1
1
57
57
1

828.5805
14
256
4096
65536
0
0
0
0
0

13955.76
10.36118
777.7444
49336.35
2918352
0.500773
0.500735
21.85747
18.73584
0.435453

59%
28%
45%
65%
82%
100%
99%
103%
177%
172%

7675987
12052
555332
24773992
1.15E+09
162
164
6852
3426
82

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.29E+10
34675.36
1.95E+08
7.86E+11
2.75E+15
81
80.98765
154312.9
113383.2
61.24691
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OLS2_WCONTROLS_SO
GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_SO
POST_SO
TIME_POST_SO
TIME_HOST_POST_SO
HOST_POST_SO
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

20317.79
32
1333.467
52135.2
2113209
0.5
0.52381
19.38095
9.690476
0.261905
0
10920.78
93231492
4.398682

20087.54
32
1296
46656
1679616
0.5
1
26
0
0
0
9646.252
57482591
3.127596

51936.89
50
2704
140608
7311616
1
1
50
50
1
10
19115.05
2.98E+08
28.69759

1398.479
14
256
4096
65536
0
0
0
0
0
-10
1398.479
17065100
-0.12790

11035.55
8.306336
580.2408
32752.46
1718913
0.501195
0.500626
19.11055
16.64215
0.440722
6.06977
6122.532
84811355
3.869783

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

21284.31
31.13354
1839.444
85009.81
4086158
0.521739
0.546584
19.40373
9.701863
0.273292

20670.82
31
1764
74088
3111696
1
1
23
0
0

57579.5
54
4096
262144
16777216
1
1
54
54
1

1148.494
8
256
4096
65536
0
0
0
0
0

13800.32
10.23086
839.5193
56245.77
3523494
0.500305
0.4986
18.93862
16.54555
0.446343

CV%
54%
26%
44%
63%
81%
100%
96%
99%
172%
168%
56%
91%
88%

Sum
4266735
6720
280028
10948392
4.44E+08
105
110
4070
2035
55
0
2293365
1.96E+10
923.7231

Sum Sq.
Dev.
2.55E+10
14420
70365984
2.24E+11
6.18E+14
52.5
52.38095
76329.52
57884.88
40.59524
7700
7.83E+09
1.50E+18
3129.82

OLS3_NO_CONTROLS_WO

GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_WO
POST_WO
TIME_POST_WO
TIME_HOST_POST_WO
HOST_POST_WO

CV%
65%
33%
46%
66%
86%
96%
91%
98%
171%
163%

Sum
6853548
10025
592301
27373159
1.32E+09
168
176
6248
3124
88

Sum Sq.
Dev.
6.11E+10
33599.26
2.26E+08
1.02E+12
3.99E+15
80.34783
79.80124
115133.5
87875.38
63.95031

OLS3_WCONTROLS_WO
Mean
GDPPC
TIME
TIME2
TIME3
TIME4
HOST_WO
POST_WO
TIME_POST_WO
TIME_HOST_POST_WO
HOST_POST_WO
EVENT_TIMELINE
GDPPC_BASE
TOTAL_POPULATION
INFLATION_RATE

22028.39
31.46774
1872.087
87076.28
4205316
0.541935
0.548387
19.69355
10.07742
0.283871
0.332258
12002
66954272
8.916902

Median
21427.26
31
1764
74088
3111696
1
1
24
0
0
1
10587.29
24746500
2.940634

Maximum
57579.5
54
4096
262144
16777216
1
1
54
54
1
10
25646.7
2.88E+08
338.4491

Std. Dev.
Minimum
1148.494
8
256
4096
65536
0
0
0
0
0
-10
2238.803
3985258
-13.70632

13525.51
10.27694
838.3756
56303.87
3537297
0.499044
0.498458
19.0998
16.7508
0.451604
6.100766
8037.756
84852574
35.57829

CV%
61%
33%
45%
65%
84%
92%
91%
97%
166%
159%
67%
127%
399%

Sum
6828801
9755
580347
26993647
1.30E+09
168
170
6105
3124
88
103
3720620
2.08E+10
2764.24

Sum Sq.
Dev.
5.65E+10
32635.18
2.17E+08
9.80E+11
3.87E+15
76.95484
76.77419
112723.9
86702.14
63.01935
11500.78
2.00E+10
2.22E+18
391136.7
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Appendix G: Preliminary Model
World Cup:

World Cup with controls:
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Summer Olympics:

Summer Olympics: With Controls
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Winter Olympics

Winter Olympics: With Controls
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Appendix H: World Cup Econometric Assumption Tests
White Test:
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
Critical value = 31.410
Obs*R-squared = 18.77
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared)

VIFS
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LM Test for serial correlation:
Ho: There is no serial correlation
HA: There is serial correlation
Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant
Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1
Critical value = 3.841
Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2
Observed R2 = 399.66
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Appendix I: Summer Olympics Econometric Assumption Tests
White Test
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
Critical value = 31.410
Obs*R-squared = 18.77
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared)

Multicollinearity:
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Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation:
Ho: There is no serial correlation
HA: There is serial correlation
Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant
Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1
Critical value = 3.841
Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2
Observed R2 = 275.30
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Appendix J: Winter Olympics Econometric Assumption Tests
White Test:
H0: Homoscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
HA: Heteroscedasticity with respect to one or more independent variables
Critical value = 31.410
Obs*R-squared = 18.77
Decision rule: reject H0 IFF and only if Obs*R-squared > critical value (Chi squared)

Multicollinearity:
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Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation:
Ho: There is no serial correlation
HA: There is serial correlation
Chi-Squared test at 5% level of significant
Degrees of freedom (# of lags) = p = 1
Critical value = 3.841
Reject Ho if Critical Value ≤ Observed R2
Observed R2 = 399.66
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Appendix K: Final Model
World Cup:

Summer Olympics:

85
Winter Olympics:
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